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In a monetarily incentivized Dictator Game, we expected Dictators’ empathy toward the 
Recipients to cause more pro-social allocations. Empathy was experimentally induced 
via a commonly used perspective taking task. Dictators (N = 474) were instructed to split 
an endowment of 10€ between themselves and an unknown Recipient. They could split 
the money 8/2 (8€ for Dictator, 2€ for Recipient) or 5/5 (5€ each). Although the empathy 
manipulation successfully increased Dictators’ feelings of empathy toward the Recipients, 
Dictators’ decisions on how to split the money were not affected. We had ample statistical 
power (above 0.99) to detect a typical social psychology effect (corresponding to r around 
0.20). Other possible determinants of generosity in the Dictator Game should 
be investigated.
Keywords: empathy, dictator game, generosity, altruism, experimental economics
INTRODUCTION
Behavior that benefits others at a personal cost to the behaving individual is a widespread 
phenomenon that continues to attract research attention in several fields, including philosophy, 
evolutionary biology, psychology, and economics. For example, humans invest time and energy 
in helping other members in their neighborhood (Van Vugt et  al., 2000), contribute to charity 
(Milinski et  al., 2002), come to each other’s rescue in crises and disasters (Loewenstein and 
Small, 2007), and help strangers in spite of potential dangers (Clark and Word, 1974). That 
human society is abundant with examples of such pro-social behaviors is sometimes considered 
particularly puzzling among economists, as it challenges the orthodox assumptions of self-interest 
inherent to many theoretically driven “rational choice” models of human behavior (Camerer, 
2003). Nevertheless, a robust body of empirical evidence based on laboratory games – which 
recreate social interactions in the laboratory using real monetary payoffs – shows that human 
behavior deviates from economic predictions of profit maximization. The game that best shows 
this incongruity is the Dictator Game (DG; Kahneman et  al., 1986; Forsythe et  al., 1994), 
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currently the most prominent paradigm used by economists 
to investigate why human behavior sometimes deviates from 
pure self-interest (Bolton et  al., 1998; Camerer, 2003; Henrich 
et  al., 2004; Engel, 2011).
The DG is a simple, two player game. Participants are assigned 
either of two roles: Dictator or Recipient. The Dictator is provided 
a fixed sum of money, which she splits between herself and the 
Recipient. Unlike many other games (e.g., the ultimatum game), 
the Recipient has no power to refuse the money – the game 
ends after the Dictator’s decision. Giving in the DG is both costly 
and unconstrained by fear of reprisal or other strategic considerations 
(Kahneman et al., 1986; Forsythe et al., 1994). Despite this, typical 
games result in Dictators donating approximately 20–30% of the 
endowment (Camerer, 2003; Engel, 2011).
Whereas economists have typically sought to explain or 
model pro-social behaviors with reference to the ultimate causes 
that could have made such behaviors evolutionarily adaptive, 
psychologists and recently also more experimentally minded 
economists have typically focused on the proximate motives 
that drive individual organisms to engage in those behaviors 
in the moment (Scott-Phillips et  al., 2011). That is, what is it 
that motivates people to devote their resources to benefitting 
others? The motivation for all intentional action, including all 
action intended to benefit others, was long assumed to be egoistic: 
people were assumed to benefit others because, ultimately, to 
do so would benefit themselves. The prevailing theories of 
egoism were challenged by the empathy-altruism hypothesis 
(Batson and Coke, 1981), according to which empathy, typically 
defined as “the ability to understand and share in another’s 
emotional state or context” (Cohen and Strayer, 1996, p.  988), 
promotes pro-social behavior in ways that cannot be accounted 
for by self-interest.
The central assertion of the empathy-altruism hypothesis is 
that empathy evokes altruistic motivation with the ultimate 
goal of increasing another’s welfare. Note that in contrast to 
the literature in economics in which altruism is typically defined 
purely behaviorally as referring to “costly acts that confer 
economic benefits on other individuals” (Fehr and Fischbacher, 
2003, p.  785), psychologists typically refer to altruism as the 
motivation to increase another person’s welfare (Batson and 
Powell, 2003). The results from the stream of studies that 
followed the empathy-altruism hypothesis generally supported 
the view that empathy causes pro-social behavior. The dispute 
pertained primarily to whether this process was driven by 
heightened personal distress caused by the other’s suffering 
(psychological egoism) or by genuine concern for the other’s 
well-being (psychological altruism; see Batson and Shaw, 1991).
The empathy-altruism hypothesis suggests that those with 
higher levels of empathy would be  expected to act in a 
more responsive way to the perceived feelings of another 
(Batson et  al., 1987; Eisenberg and Miller, 1987; Andreoni, 
1990; Batson, 1991; Andreoni and Miller, 2002). We therefore 
expected that increasing Dictator’s empathy toward the 
Recipient by means of a widely used perspective-taking 
exercise (Coke et  al., 1978; Batson, 1991, 2011; Davis et  al., 
1996; Stürmer et  al., 2005; Ames et  al., 2008) would lead 
the Dictator to make more generous allocations in the DG. 
Despite the obvious, almost trite, and basically commonsense 
nature of this hypothesis, we  found no research that would 
directly test it. The closest we  came was a study by Batson 
and Moran (1999), who found it remarkable that although 
more than 2,000 prisoner’s dilemma studies had been 
conducted by the early 1990s, none of them had “tested 
the relatively straight-forward derivation from the empathy-
altruism hypothesis that inducing empathy for the other 
person in a one-trial prisoner’s dilemma will increase 
cooperation” (p. 911; note that what they denoted co-operation, 
we  would subsume under the more general concept of 
pro-social behavior). In fact, our hypothesis is even more 
straightforward than the one tested by Batson and Moran 
(1999). Although defection in the prisoner’s dilemma is 
always rational from a self-interested perspective, the ideal 
outcome in a prisoner’s dilemma is mutual co-operation, 
providing more complex motives for pro-social behavior than 
the motives present in the DG (Camerer, 2003; Lönnqvist 
et  al., 2013). Having argued that inducing empathy for the 
other person in a one-trial prisoner’s dilemma should introduce 
a new pro-social motive – altruism – and that this motive 
should increase co-operation, Batson and Moran (1999) found 
support for this hypothesis. However, this influential study 
(cited around 300 times) has never been replicated. The 
small sample size [N  =  60, i.e., 10 participants in each cell 
of a 3 (High Empathy vs. Low Empathy vs. Control) × 2 
(Business Frame vs. Exchange Frame)] design may raise 
concerns regarding the replicability of the findings (Open 
Science Collaboration, 2015). Although there are still many 
open questions in the current discussion on replicability, 
there is general agreement that previous social psychology 
research has often been vastly underpowered and that sample 
sizes now need to increase. The primary purpose of the 
present research was thus to investigate, in a large enough 
sample, to what extent empathy leads DG Dictators to be 
more generous in their allocations.
Note that Batson and Moran (1999) sought to investigate 
whether empathy increases altruism. Although allocations in 
the DG have been described as altruistic (Benenson et  al., 
2007; Ben-Ner and Kramer, 2011; Israel et al., 2012), we reserve 
this term to denote the possible psychological motives underlying 
pro-social behavior. That is, we  do not investigate whether 
empathy leads to altruistic motivation (cf. Batson and Moran, 
1999), but whether empathy leads to more generous behavior 
in the DG, regardless of motives.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants and Procedure
Our study was conducted with 506 participants [mean 
age  =  23.45 (SD  =  4.03); 59% female] from the University of 
Cologne (Germany) majoring in different disciplines. Participants 
were invited via a Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research 
(CLER) mailing list with approximately 3,700 subscribers who 
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had signed up to take part in experiments. Sixteen experimental 
sessions were run with 30–32 participants per session. In each 
session, only two participants were chosen to be  Recipients 
(32 Recipients in all) because we  wanted to maximize the 
number of Dictators given our monetary constraints, leaving 
us with 474 Dictators (no-one was excluded). Participants did 
not know that there were only two Recipients in each session. 
In each session, the two Recipients were randomly matched 
with two Dictators and paid accordingly.
Upon arrival, participants were randomly (1) seated in 
computer cubicles that secured anonymity, (2) assigned a 
role (Dictator or Recipient), (3) paired into dyads, and 
provided with written instructions. All experimental sessions 
were conducted on the computer using the experimental 
platform z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The experiment lasted 
for about an hour (participants completed a questionnaire 
after the DG). Subsequently, participants were compensated 
with a fixed amount of 4€ along with the amount that they 
earned in the DG.
In the Empathy condition (N  =  240), Dictators were asked, 
before making their decision, to write three sentences on a 
sheet of paper handed out to them about how they imagined 
the Recipient’s feelings and how their decision would affect 
the Recipient. They were given 5  min to complete this widely 
used empathy inducing task (Coke et  al., 1978; Fultz et  al., 
1986; Batson et  al., 1988). In the control condition (N  = 234), 
participants were asked to write three sentences about 
yesterday’s weather.
Measures
At the outset of the DG, the Dictator was provided with an 
amount of 10€ that was to be  distributed between herself and 
the Recipient. The Dictator could choose the option “8/2” that 
yielded 8€ for herself and 2€ for the other person or she 
could choose the option “5/5” that yielded equal payoffs of 
5€ for both. The Recipient did not make any decision and 
the game was played only once. We  chose the distribution 
8/2 as our selfish option because the mean transfer in DGs 
is approximately 20–30% of the endowment (Camerer, 2003; 
Engel, 2011), suggesting that such a division is one that many 
participants would feel comfortable with [although continuous 
DGs have become increasingly popular, the game was originally 
dichotomous (Kahneman et  al., 1986) and we  wanted to keep 
it that way for reasons explained below].
As a manipulation check, participants rated on a scale from 
0 (not at all) to 6 (very much) to what extent they felt empathetic, 
sympathetic, affectionate, warm, compassionate, caring, and 
concerned in relation to the Recipient. The mean of the seven 
items was 2.484 (SD  =  1.343) and Cronbach’s α was 0.90. Due 
to a technical mistake, the results of the manipulation check 
were not recorded in two of the sessions that we  ran, which led 
to 60 participants having missing data on the manipulation check.
After the manipulation check, participants completed a short 
questionnaire that contained a measure of personal values and 
a standard set of demographic variables including sex and age. 
No other measures were administered. However, as we, at the 
outset, were interested also in the possible associations between 
empathy and hypocrisy, the option to flip a coin in order to 
determine the outcome was included as a parallel experimental 
manipulation that we  report on only briefly. That is, half of 
the participants received a coin that they could flip in order 
to decide between the 5/5 and 8/2 outcomes. The coin was 
placed on the desk of the cubicle in which the Dictators made 
their decision and the accompanying instructions told Dictators 
that they could use the coin to determine their choice (it was 
this aspect of the research design that required us to employ 
a dichotomous dictator decision). Whether or not the participants 
were provided with the coin did not affect their decisions 
(F  <  1 for both the main effect and the interaction between 
providing a coin and the empathy manipulation). All results, 
i.e., manipulation check results and Dictator decisions, were 
virtually identical for Dictators who received and did not receive 
a coin.
RESULTS
The manipulation check showed that the manipulation of 
empathy was effective. Those primed with empathy scored 
2.699 (95% CI: 2.5336–2.865) on feelings of empathy toward 
the Recipient, whereas those in the control condition scored 
2.188 [95% CI: 1.987–2.389; F (1, 411)  =  15.13, η2  =  0.035 
(corresponding to an effect size of d  =  0.39), p  <  0.001]. 
Whether or not Dictators received a coin in no way influenced 
the results of the manipulation check [without coin, those 
primed with empathy scored 2.654 and those not primed 
with empathy scored 2.157 (d  =  0.35, p  <  0.05); with coin, 
those primed with empathy scored 2.744 and those not primed 
with empathy scored 2.204 (d = 0.44, p < 0.001)]. All analyses 
were run with sex, age, and their interactions with other 
variables as covariates (including the abovementioned parallel 
manipulation with/without coin), but as the results were 
always virtually identical, only analyses without covariates 
are presented.
Among those 240 Dictators who received the empathy prime, 
151 (62.92%) chose the 8/2 and 89 (37.08%) chose the 5/5 
distribution. Among the 234 Dictators in the control condition, 
162 (69.23%) chose the 8/2 and 72 (30.77%) chose the 5/5 
distribution (see Figure 1). A chi-square test of independence 
was calculated comparing the frequency of the 5/5 choice 
among those primed with empathy and those in the control 
group. The difference between the two conditions (empathy 
vs. control) was not statistically significant [χ2(1)  =  2.106, 
ω  =  0.067 (95% CI: −0.024–0.154), p  =  0.147]; this difference 
was also not significant when looking separately at Dictators 
who did not receive a coin and Dictators who did receive a 
coin [χ2(1)  =  0.4554 and χ2(1)  =  0.1970, respectively, both 
p  >  0.15]. The effect size ω  =  0.067 corresponds directly to 
an effect size of r  =  0.067. Sensitivity analyses showed that 
we would have had an above 99% chance of detecting a typical 
social psychology effect size (r  =  0.20; Richard et  al., 2003; 
Stanley et  al., 2019).
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DISCUSSION
The current experiment tested the hypothesis that increasing 
Dictator’s empathy toward the Recipient would lead the Dictator 
to make more generous allocations in the DG. This hypothesis 
was refuted by the empirical evidence. We  were thus with an 
eight-fold number of participants and a more straightforward 
experimental setup – the DG is motivationally less complex 
than the prisoner’s dilemma – unable to reproduce the positive 
significant effect of empathy on pro-social behavior reported 
by Batson and Moran (1999). Importantly, the experimental 
manipulation of empathy was successful: Dictators instructed 
to imagine the Recipient’s feelings felt more empathy toward 
the Recipient. There were also no ceiling or roof effects that 
could have distorted the results – in all, 161 (33.97%) of our 
474 Dictators chose the equal allocation.
Although there is no one-to-one correspondence between 
pro-social behavior and altruism and we  did not set out to 
investigate whether empathy leads to altruistic motivation, our 
results do speak to the empathy-altruism hypothesis. Because 
empathy did not increase pro-social behavior, it seems reasonable 
to conclude that it did not cause altruistic motivation, or at 
least not strong altruistic motivation. This can be  considered 
surprising, taking into account that the empathy-altruism 
hypothesis has been supported by a large number of social 
psychology studies. One important advantage of investigating 
pro-social behavior in a monetarily incentivized DG is that 
it requires individuals to put their money where their mouth 
is. This is typically not the case in social psychology experiments. 
It seems possible that the altruistic motivation caused by 
empathy is so weak that even moderate monetary incentives 
(recall that our Dictators chose between an 8/2 and 5/5 allocation 
of 10€) will override it. In case the stakes had been smaller 
(or hypothetical), Dictators could have been more inclined to 
act upon their feelings of empathy. Empathy has indeed been 
suggested to increase only superficial minimal-cost helping 
(Neuberg et  al., 1997). Consistent with this line of thought, 
the study by Batson and Moran (1999) that found a positive 
effect for empathy required participants to allocate lottery 
tickets, and the mean expected pay-off was only $0.50. Employing 
at least moderate monetary incentives in future studies on the 
effects of empathy on pros-social behavior and altruistic 
motivation could be  highly revealing.
Some explanations of DG behavior allude to morality. People 
generally wish to consider themselves moral (Aquino and Reed, 
2002), and judgments about right and wrong could thus guide 
Dictators’ behavior. Some researchers within moral psychology 
have viewed empathy as a source of principled moral judgment 
(Nussbaum, 1996, 2001; Haidt, 2003) and as a mechanism 
selected by evolution as a proximate mechanism to generate 
altruism (De Waal, 2008). If an equal allocation (5/5) is judged 
more moral than an unfair allocation (8/2), our results suggest 
that feeling empathy toward someone does not always lead to 
more moral behavior toward that person. However, we  also 
note that even though the manipulation of empathy was effective, 
empathy was still rather low, well below the midpoint of the 
empathy scale. One reason that empathy has by some researchers 
been argued to be  a poor guide to moral judgments is that 
we  may feel empathy only toward in-group members (Batson, 
2011; Jordan et  al., 2016; Bloom, 2017). It seems possible that 
the anonymous Recipient was not considered an in-group 
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FIGURE 1 | Frequency of 8/2 and 5/5 choices in the empathy and in the control condition.
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or even interdependence of empathy and group membership 
(in-group vs. out-group Recipient) in the determination of 
Dictator behavior should be an interesting topic for future research.
Some other limitations of the present research need to 
be  acknowledged. The independent variable, the manipulation 
check, and the dependent variable can all be  criticized. Our 
manipulation was rather broad in the sense that it did not 
allow us to differentiate between affective and cognitive components 
of empathy. Regarding the manipulation check, the items that 
we  employed to assess the effectiveness of the manipulation 
were very blatant in their content and could have been subject 
to demand effects – participants in the empathy condition could 
have noticed the connection between the instructions to write 
about “how they imagined the Recipients’ feelings and how 
their decision would affect the Recipient” and the items asking 
them to rate how much they felt “sympathetic”, “caring”, etc. A 
standardized questionnaire allowing for the assessment of various 
components of empathy would have been preferable as a 
manipulation check. It is now possible that participants did not 
really feel empathy but were simply providing answers they 
thought the experimenter wanted. These lines of criticism all 
suggest that the manipulation was at fault – it did not really 
induce empathy (only demand effects), it did not induce the 
relevant type of empathy, or it induced only weak empathy. 
These are all valid criticisms, all the more important because 
we employed the most commonly used and face-valid manipulation 
of empathy that we  could find. How exactly empathy and other 
states can best be  manipulated and how the success of such 
manipulations can best be  measured are very basic and very 
important topics for future research. Regarding the dependent 
variable, constraining the action space of the Dictator to a 
dichotomous choice could be argued to have affected the behavior 
of the Dictator. However, meta-analyses that have investigated 
the effects of action space on Dictator behavior have, depending 
on the type of analysis, found no statistically significant effects 
or extremely small effects (amount of explained variance < 0.001) 
for action space on Dictator behavior (Engel, 2011). Nevertheless, 
in the absence of prior empirical research directly comparing 
dichotomous and more continuous measures of DG behavior, 
we  are forced to acknowledge that a more continuous measure 
of DG behavior could have given a different result. A continuous 
measure of DG giving would also have given us slightly more 
power to detect a small effect.
Our results could be  sensitive to population differences. 
For example, non-student populations could be  more affected 
by empathy (students of at least some disciplines, such as 
philosophy, may be less affected by feelings when making moral 
judgments; Haidt, 2001). Nevertheless, we caution that moderator 
effects are best detected when the relation between predictor 
and outcome is substantial (Chaplin, 1991). The present results 
show that empathy is even at best not a strong predictor of 
DG giving, implying that statistical tests of interaction effects 
would require extremely large samples.
We are also forced to acknowledge that our sample size was 
not only too small to investigate possible moderator effects, but 
it was also too small to rule out the possibility of a true small 
effect. Although we  had a 99% chance of detecting a typical 
social psychology effect (r  =  0.20), we  would have needed 1,076 
participants – above double the amount that we actually had – to 
have 80% power to detect a small effect (r  =  0.10). The reason 
for the lack of prior published research on the hypothesis that 
we  set out to test; i.e., that empathy would lead the Dictator to 
make more generous allocations in the DG, could be  that the 
effect is so small that the results of prior empirical studies have 
typically not reached conventional levels of statistical significance. 
Publication bias could have led to under-reporting of such findings. 
In fact, chronically low statistical power and some degree of 
selective reporting bias have led to an overestimation of effect 
sizes in social psychology (Stanley et  al., 2019), which means 
that if there is a small effect of empathy of DG giving, something 
we  cannot rule out with the current sample size, it could well 
be  that the size of that effect is not that different from the real 
size of a typical social psychology effect.
Also supporting the view that empathy, even at best, is not 
a strong predictor of DG behavior is that research on the effects 
of trait empathy on DG giving has produced miscellaneous results. 
A currently popular view in research on individual differences 
is that states can be  viewed as density distributions of states 
(Fleeson, 2001). This would suggest that one could expect similar 
behavioral effects for traits and states. Research on the effects 
of trait empathy on DG giving has produced mixed results, with 
some studies finding an effect for some aspects of empathy (Edele 
et  al., 2013) and some not finding an effect (Artinger et  al., 
2014; Zhao et  al., 2017). These results together with our results 
suggest that if an effect does exist, it is likely to be  rather small.
Sample size is more generally an issue within research on 
the DG. Many of the most-cited papers, with the number 
of citations running into the thousands, could be underpowered, 
with sample sizes beginning from the 20s and rarely reaching 
even 200 participants, even when collapsing data across all 
sub-studies, conditions, or treatments (e.g., Eckel and Grossman, 
1996, 1998; Hoffman et  al., 1996; Haley and Fessler, 2005). 
The hazards of small sample sizes are well illustrated by the 
entire research programs on the “watching eyes” or “minimal 
social cues” phenomena that were inspired by one study with 
124 dictators (Haley and Fessler, 2005). This frenzy of research 
resulted in numerous high-impact publications from different 
laboratories. But more recent large-scale studies (Raihani and 
Bshary, 2012) and meta-analysis (Northover et al., 2017) have 
cast much doubt on the existence of the phenomena.
The above referred to research on “watching eyes” is only 
one small example of the literature that has sought the 
determinants of pro-social behavior in the DG. Highly cited 
researches conducted according to the stringent scientific 
procedures set out by the experimental economics community 
(e.g., real monetary incentives, no deception) have identified 
for instance guilt (Gummerum et al., 2010), inequality aversion 
(Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), moral costs (Brañas-Garza, 2007), 
and affect (Schulz et  al., 2014) as determinants of pro-social 
behavior in the DG (the sample sizes of these studies vary 
from the low 20s to just under 140). The designs and conditions 
in which the experiments have been run could be  argued to 
be rigorous and free of bias, making the general lack of statistical 
power considerations all the more surprising. This raises the 
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possibility that many of these studies, and perhaps most other 
studies, on the determinants of DG are likely to have been 
underpowered. Feelings of empathy, although not a determinant 
of DG giving according to our results, could be  expected to 
be  strongly associated with many of the above suggested 
determinants of DG behavior, such as guilt (e.g., Leith and 
Baumeister, 1998). We  therefore wish to raise the question of 
the replicability of previous findings and suggest that the 
determinants of DG behavior need to be  explored further. It 
could be  that we  actually know very little about what drives 
behavior in the DG and thus also very little about what the 
DG actually measures.
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